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Divided We Stand: Concerted Activity
and the Maturing of the NLRA

B. Glenn George*

[A] thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within
the statute, because not within its spirit .... 1

Robert Ewing was laid off in 1980 from his job as a piledriver
operator with Herbert F. Darling, Inc. 2 A month before the layoff,
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) conducted an inspection of the jobsite at which Mr. Ewing worked.
Darling refused to recall Mr. Ewing because of the belief that Mr.
Ewing's complaint to OSHA initiated the inspection. The company
was mistaken. The OSHA inspection was not prompted by a complaint. Neither Mr. Ewing nor any other employee was responsible.
Yet the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) concluded that Darling had committed no unfair labor practice. Mr.
Ewing was fired lawfully under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or the Act).3
Copyright© 1988 by B. Glenn George.
• Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law (College ofWilliam
and Mary). B.A. 1975, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; J.D. 1978, Harvard
Law School. An earlier draft of this Article was presented at a faculty colloquium at
Case Western Reserve University Law School on April 6, 1987. The author would like
to thank the faculty of Case Western Reserve for their helpful comments. Thanks are
also due to Betty Abele for the speed and accuracy with which she typed numerous
drafts and revisions.
I. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619 (1967).
2. The facts of Robert Ewing's discharge are taken from Herbert F. Darling, Inc.,
267 N.L.R.B. 476 (1983), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ewing v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 1117 (2d
Cir.), aff'd on reh'g, 273 N.L.R.B. 346 (1984), remanded, 768 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1985),
reaff'd, 287 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 1977-1988 NLRD Dec. (CCH) 1! 19,237 (Feb. 29, 1988).
3. 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-169 (1982).
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Kenneth Prill suffered a similar fate. 4 Mr. Prill was a truck driver
for Meyers Industries. Mr. Prill complained to his employer on several occasions about the brakes and steering on his equipment. Mr.
Prill's trailer was cited for several defects by an Ohio inspection station after Mr. Prill had experienced more problems with the brakes.
The brakes failed again on a trip through Tennessee, resulting in an
accident. Mr. Prill telephoned the company and was told to get the
trailer back "as best he could." 5 Mr. Prill instead contacted the
Tennessee Public Service Commission. The inspection by the Commission required that the trailer be taken out of service because of
faulty brakes and damage to the trailer hitch. Mr. Prill was fired
when he returned home for "calling the cops like this all the time." 6
The Board found the termination lawful under the Act. 7
The problem, in a word, is the "concerted" nature of these individuals' activities. Section 7 of the NLRA grants to employees "the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 8 Under the Board's
current interpretation of the scope of Section 7, the participation of
more than one employee is required to satisfy the "concerted" language of the statute. Mr. Ewing and Mr. Prill regrettably failed to
obtain partners for their real or imagined activities. No one questions that two employees acting together under identical circumstances would be immune from discharge for their safety
complaints. 9 The employee who acts alone, however, may be risking her job.
The concert requirement is a troubling one, particularly when
highlighted by the sympathetic plights of real people like Robert
Ewing and Kenneth Prill. The reaction of both lawyers and laymen
is likely to be, "That's not fair." Yet to say that legal relief is needed
is not to say that the NLRA is or should be the source of that relief.
Mr. Ewing, for example, may be protected under OSHA provisions
that prohibit retaliatory discharge for employee complaints or participation in OSHA inspections. 1° Comparable protection was unavailable for Mr. Prill, however. 11 No systematic coverage exists to
4. The facts of Kenneth Prill's discharge are taken from Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers
/), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497-98 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985), reaff'd, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1137 (1986}, aff'd, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
5. 268 N.L.R.B. at 497.
6. !d. at 498.
7. /d. at 498-99.
8. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (emphasis added). Employer interference
with section 7 rights constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 8(a}(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (1982).
9. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982).
11. Section 405 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 might have
protected Mr. Prill today, but the Act was not in force at the time of his discharge. See
Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, tit. IV, § 405, 96
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shield the lone employee seeking to improve her working
conditions.
One is compelled to look to the NLRA for assistance, and it seems
a natural source. As the first comprehensive legislation creating and
protecting employee rights, the NLRA could be described optimistically as a bill of rights for the American worker. 12 Viewed in a broad
perspective, the Act appears to be an appropriate place to seek protection of an employee's right to communicate job-related concerns
to her employer.
To state that the Act should protect the voice of the individual is
not to establish that it does. The current Board reads the statutory
protection of "concerted activities" narrowly. 13 Certainly nothing
in the language of section 7 demands the protection of the lone employee, yet neither does section 7 explicitly forbid the inclusion of a
single employee's complaint. In the context of an organized shop,
the Supreme Court in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems 14 recently rejected a literal reading of the term "concerted" and protected a single employee's attempt to enforce a provision of a collective
bargaining agreement. 15
This Article proposes that a preoccupation with section 7 terminology is misplaced. "Statutory interpretation requires more than
concentration upon isolated words." 16 The protection of the single
voice must be evaluated not in terms of the various rights created by
the Act, but in terms of the structure of the Act and the process established for employee-management relationships. From this perspective, the Board's rigid insistence that activity be "concerted"
weakens and distorts the existing structure of the statutory scheme.
The protection of the individual's right of communication is a necessary corollary of the Act's structure.
Pursuing a structural approach, rather than the Board's literal interpretation of the term "concerted," admittedly presents dangers.
The apparent injustice to Mr. Ewing and Mr. Prill might prompt one
to characterize the statutory provisions unfairly in order to reach a
desired result. The protection of employees who find themselves in
similar dilemmas may be the "right" result, but the "rightness"
Stat. 2097, 2157 (1983) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. § 2305 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985)).
12. See Klare, judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 270-93 (1978); Summers, Past Premises,
Present Failures, and Future Needs in Labor Legislation, 31 BUFFALO L. REv. 9, 9-13 (1982)
[hereinafter Summers, Past PremiSes]; Summers, Industrial Democracy: America's Unfulfilled
Promise, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 29, 29-34 (1979) [hereinafter Summers, Industrial
Democracy].
13. See infra notes 45-51, 53-55 and accompanying text.
14. 465 u.s. 822 (1984).
15. Id. at 825.
16. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250 (1970).
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must be justified. In this instance, thatjustification depends on how
one regards the statute and defines its role.
Although the NLRA usually is viewed as the law governing unionmanagement relations, it always has provided some protection for
non-union and unrepresented employees protesting working conditions.17 As unionization continues to decline, 18 the future significance of the Act will depend on the perception of the legislation as
static or dynamic. Having reached its fiftieth anniversary, the Act
has been the target of substantial criticism. Some claim that we are
too far removed from the political climate of 1935 for the Act to
remain an effective tool. 19 Congress intentionally drafted the NLRA
in broad and general terms, however, to ensure its adaptability to
changes in the workplace. 20 The workplace is now largely unorganized. The continued viability of the Act may depend, in part, on the
willingness of the Board to shift its focus to the non-union
workforce. This opportunity is present within the Act's existing
structure and, indeed, this Article contends, is compelled by that
structure - the "spirit" of the NLRA.
The examination of this problem begins with a brief summary of
the Board's development of concerted activity protection. 21 This
Article then reviews the judicial response, focusing on the Supreme
Court's recent decision in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc. 22 and
the growing circuit court controversy over the current Board's redirection in this area. This Article reexamines the problem by considering the limitations of traditional statutory construction and the
potential elucidation of a structural analysis. By concentrating on
the processes of labor relations under the NLRA, this Article concludes that protection of the individual under appropriate circumstances is a necessary part of the Act's existing structure.

I.
A.

Setting the Stage

NLRB Development

Read literally, the section 7 requirement that activity be concerted
would protect only groups of two or more employees acting
17. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962); Walls Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 321 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 923 (1963).
18. See infra note 157; see also Rees, The Size of Union Membership in Manufacturing in the
1980s, in THE SHRINKING PERIMETER 43-44 (H. Juris & M. Roomkin eds. 1980).
19. See infra note 158.
20. See NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975); see also infra note 120.
21. The development of case law in this area, through both the Board and the
courts, has been reviewed extensively elsewhere and need not be repeated here. See, e.g.,
Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of "Concert" Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 286, 289-328 (1981); Note, Protection of Individual Action
as "Concerted Activity" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 68 CoRNELL L. REv. 369, 37786 (1983); Note, National Labor Relations Act Section 7: Protecting Employee Activity Through
Implied Concert of Action, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 813, 816-36 (1981) [hereinafter Northwestern
Note]. For a thorough judicial discussion of the case law, see Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d
941,945-56 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985). For the purposes of this Article, the case law development will be highlighted only as necessary to set the framework
for the discussion that follows.
·
22. 465 u.s. 822 (1984).
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together. Two or more employees joindy protesting working conditions are acting unquestionably in "concert" within the meaning of
Section 7. 23 The "protected" nature of the employees' behavior is
the only issue to be addressed. Although engaged in concerted activity, employees may lose the Act's protection if their conduct is
illegal, unreasonably disruptive, or in violation of a collective bargaining agreement. 24 Yet as long as at least two employees act together, the concert requirement is met automatically. Had Mr.
Ewing and Mr. Prill faced their employers with the support of fellow
employees, their discharges would have been improper.
Even in its current retrenchment, however, the Board does not
read section 7 as narrowly as it might be construed. A single employee complaining to her employer is engaged in concerted activity
if she was designated a spokesman by one or more other employees.25 Similarly, the Board continues to protect an individual's efforts to enlist the support of other employees concerning workrelated issues. 26 In the well-known Mushroom Transportation Company 27 case, the Third Circuit supported protection of individual activity "with the object of initiating or inducing or preparing for
group action" or when the activity "had some relation to group action in the interest of the employees." 28 Thus, a sole employee's
23. See, e.g., Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980); Jim Causley
Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1980); Meyers Indus., Inc. (Me)·ers /), 268
N.L.R.B. 493, remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 948 (1985), reaff'd, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137 (1986), aff'd,
835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir 1987); Traylor-Pamco, 154 N.L.R.B. 380 (1965); Root-Carlin,
Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1313 (1951); cf. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984)
("Although one could interpret the phrase, 'to engage in other concerted activities,' to
refer to a situation in which two or more employees are working together at the same
time and the same place toward a common goal, the language of § 7 does not confine
itself to such a narrow meaning.").
24. See, e.g., NLRB v. Locall229, International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464,
472 (1953) (discharges for disloyalty upheld); Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31,
48 (1942) (unlawful activity); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 25859 (1939) (violence); NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939) (breach of contract);
Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 724, 729 (5th Cir. 1970) (insubordination); Yellow Freight Sys., 247 N.L.R.B. 177, 181 (1980) (insubordination); Peck, Inc.,
226 N.L.R.B. 1174, 1174 (1976) (employees properly terminated for refusing to leave
the plant and preventing employer from closing at end of shift);J.P. Stevens & Co., 219
N.L.R.B. 850, 850 (1975) (employer lawfully discharged 22 employees who disrupted
meeting to discuss anti-union sentiments), enforced, 547 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1976).
25. See Dollar Branch Coal Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 428, 429 (1984); Meyers I, 268
N.L.R.B. at 497 (1984), remanded, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948
(1985); Hitchiner Mfg. Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 927, 940-41 (1979); Wilson Freight Co., 234'
N.L.R.B. 844,847 (1978), enforcement denied, 604 F.2d 712 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 962 (1980); Barnsider, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 754, 760 (1972). Other types of individual activity are expressly referenced by Section 7, including the rights to join or assist a
labor organization. See NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
26. See, e.g., Root-Carlin, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1313, 1314 (1951); Central Steel Tube
Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 604, 612-13, enforced, 139 F.2d 489 (8th Cir. 1943).
27. Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964).
28. /d. at 685. The Mushroom Transportation standard was widely adopted by other

1988]

. 513

attempts to organize a union or circulate a petition protesting working conditions are considered protected concerted activity. The
current Board recently affirmed its adherence to the Mushroom
Transportation standard. 29
The existence of a collective bargaining agreement may provide
the lone employee additional protection. The so-called "Interboro
doctrine" was introduced almost twenty-five years ago. 30 In the
landmark decision of lnterboro Contractors, Inc., 31 affirmed by the Second Circuit, the Board interpreted section 7 as shielding an individual employee who asserts a right contained in a collective
bargaining agreement. Under the Board's rationale, the claim of a
collectively bargained right operates as an extension of the concerted action in negotiating the contract32 and affects the rights of
all employees covered by the agreement. 33
The Board reached the watershed of protection for concerted activity in 197 5 by extending the Interboro doctrine to the assertion of
statutory employee rights. In Alleluia Cushion Co., 34 the Board declared unlawful the discharge of an employee for filing a complaint
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The Board reasoned
that the NLRA should support public policy declared through other
employee protection statutes. 35 According to the Board, this support is guaranteed by protecting the employee who asserts her right
under the statute or, as sometimes referred to, acts as an "implied
spokesman" for all employees affected by the statute. In later cases,
the Board justified its position by emphasizing the deterrent effect
on other employees if an employer were permitted to terminate the
complaining employee for claiming a statutory right or benefit. 36
circuit courts, although interpretations and applications of the doctrine have varied. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Datapoint Corp., 642 F.2d 123, 128-29 (5th Cir. 1981) (individual complaints did not constitute concerted activity in absence of "substantial evidence" of intent to instigate group action); Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 28-29 (7th
Cir. 1980) ("personal griping" about overtime unprotected even though other employees made similar complaints); Randolph Div., Ethan Allen, Inc. v. NLRB, 513 F.2d 706,
708 (1st Cir. 1975) (individual complaints concerning interest in union organization
were protected); Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th
Cir. 1969) (activities intended to enlist support of other employees to protest working
conditions protected as concerted).
29. See Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers II), 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137, 1142 (1986) (dictum) ("To clarify, we intend that Meyers I be read as fully embracing the view of concertedness exemplified by the Mushroam Transportation line of cases. We reiterate, our
definition of concerted activity in Meyers I encompasses those circumstances where individuals seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action."), aff'd sub nom. Prill
v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Walter Bruckner & Co., 273 N.L.R.B.
1306, 1306 n.6 (1984); Vought Corp., 273 N.L.R.B. 1290, 1294 (1984).
30. See Bunney Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1516, 1518 (1962).
31. 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
32. See 139 N.L.R.B. at 1519.
33. See Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. at 1298.
34. 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
35. See id. at 1000.
36. See, e.g., Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., 245 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1053 (1979)
(worker's compensation claim), enforcement denied, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980); Self Cycle & Marine Distrib. Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 75, 76 (1978) (unemployment compensation
claim).
'
Other cases in which the Board protected agency complaints as concerted activity
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The Board extended the implied spokesman concept of Alleluia
even further in subsequent cases involving common employee concerns where no statutory right was at issue. The complaint of one
employee was deemed concerted in circumstances where other employees discussed or expressed the same dissatisfaction. 37 Commentators suggested this rationale could be carried so far as to
include any employee complaint which could be a concern to other
employees or which would affect other employees. 38 Although the
Board's language in these cases might justify such an expansive
reading, 39 the facts of the cases do not. Upon closer examination,
the cases cited for this proposition consistently include substantial
evidence that the complaint in question was in fact shared by other
employees. The employee discharged could be fairly characterized
as an informal, volunteer spokesman.
In Sullair P. T.O., Inc., 40 for example, an employee was discharged
include Apollo Tire Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1627, 1633 (1978) (U.S. Department of Labor),
aff'd sub nom. NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1979); Flynn
Paving Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 721, 722 (1978) (Michigan Civil Rights Commission); B & P
Motors Express, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 653, 655 (1977) (Department of Transportation);
and Triangle Tool & Eng'g, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1354, 1354 (1976) (Wage and Hour
Division).
37. See, e.g., Sullair P.T.O., Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 614, 616 (1980) (discussed infra at
notes 40-41 and accompanying text), enforcement denied, 641 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1981);
Ontario Knife Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1288 (1980) (two employees complained about
work assignment, one walked out in protest), enforcement denied, 637 F.2d 840 (2d Cir.
1980); Steere Dairy, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1351 (1978) (single employee walked out
after group discussion of pay and working conditions); Fairmont Hotel Co., 230
N.L.R.B. 874, 878 (1977) (employee acting as "spokesman" to complain about tipping
arrangements); Diagnostic Center Hosp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 1215, 1217 (1977) (employee discharged unlawfully for writing letter protesting salaries, where other employees had expressed similar concern); Oklahoma Allied Tel. Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 916, 92021 (1974) (discharge for complaint about air conditioning unlawful where employees
had complained among themselves); Carbet Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 892, 892 (1971) (employee's complaint on behalf of himself and others concerning ventilation system constituted concerted activity); Hugh H. Wilson Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1040, 1046 (1968)
(protest about profit-sharing distribution involved concerted activity " 'for the benefit of
the ... group'"), enforced, 414 F.2d 1345 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1969);
Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Coop, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 618, 623-24 (1959) (three employees who complained independently about selection of foreman were engaged in protected, concerted activity), enforced, 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960). For a more complete
discussion of this line of cases, see Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 293-99. See also
NLRB v. Charles H. McCauley Assocs., 657 F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 1981).
38. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 294; Northwestern Note, supra note 21, at
813, 833-34.
39. See, e.g., Tyler Business Servs., Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 567, 567 (1981) ("[A]n employee's complaint concerning working conditions of employees is protected activity.");
Air Surrey Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1064, 1065 (1977) (finding act of individual "concerted," relying in part "on the likelihood that the other employees, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, shared his interest"), vacated, 601 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1979); cf.
Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (1966) (stating that complaints
seeking to enforce collective bargaining agreement "affect the rights of all employees in
the unit, and thus constitute concerted activity"), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
40. 250 N.L.R.B. 614 (1980); see Northwestern Note, supra note 21, at 833 n.ll6.
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for disputing a change in the employer's policy permitting employees to purchase gasoline at a reduced price. The employee's complaints occurred in a meeting between the company controller and
seven to twelve employees. This meeting was requested by another
employee following an earlier meeting between management and
employees to discuss the change. The discharged employee was
only one of many who questioned the policy change, although his
complaints may have been more vocal and adamant. 41 In St. joseph s
High School, 42 a lay teacher in a parochial school was terminated for
circulating a negative report about the school and mailing the report
to the school's accreditation committee. The employee in question
was a former president of the lay teachers' certified union. He prepared the report after discussions with other faculty members and
with the assistance of three former teachers of the high school.43
Reconsideration of the Alleluia doctrine was the focus of the
Reagan Board's recent decision in Meyers Industries, Inc. (Meyers I).44
Meyers I involved the termination of Kenneth Prill for contacting
state officials about faulty brakes on his employer's truck. 45 The
Board reexamined the boundaries of section 7 and concluded that
its protection was dependent upon "interaction among employees."46 Alleluia and its progeny were explicitly overruled.47 In its
place, the Board articulated a four-part test for protection under
section 7. 48 First, the activity must be "with or on the authority of
other employees. " 49 Second, the employer must know of the concerted nature of the conduct. Third, the activity must be "protected
by the Act" (i.e., the conduct must be for a legitimate objective using permissible means to accomplish that objective). 5° Finally, the
protected concerted activity must have motivated the action taken
41. 250 N.L.R.B. at 616-18.
42. 236 N.L.R.B. 1623 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 248 N.L.R.B. 901 (1980); see
Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 295-96.
43. 236 N.L.R.B. at 1624; see also Tyler Business Servs., Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 567, 567
(1981) (discharged employee had discussed complaints with other employees as part of
initiation of union organization drive); Diagnostic Center Hosp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B.
1215, 1218 (1977) (dictum) (employees complained among themselves); Fairmont Hotel
Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 874, 878 (1977) (other employees asked discharged employee to
"find out" about issue in dispute); Oklahoma Allied Tel. Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 916, 918
(1974) (employees had complained among themselves).
44. 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985), reaff'd, 281 N.L.R.B. 118 (1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d
1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
45. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
46. Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 494.
47. Id. at 496.
48. See id. at 497.
49. Id. at 498.
50. In order to be protected under section 7, employee conduct must be for the
purpose of "mutual aid or protection." See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
Certain labor organization objectives are specifically prohibited by the Act, such as secondary boycotts, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982), and organizational picketing under defined circumstances, id. § 158(b)(7). The means of protest also must be protected. See
supra note 24. Sit-down strikes, see Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940);
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939), and slow-downs, see NLRB
v. Blades Mfg. Corp., 344 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965), for example, are considered unprotected even in furtherance of legitimate objectives.
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against the employee.5I
In a strongly worded dissent, Member Zimmerman, a Carter appointee, criticized the Board majority for ignoring the dual rationale
underlying Alleluia. The first justification was that safe working conditions are a matter of inherent concern to other employees.
Alleluia, in essence, presumed "concert" whenever an employee's
complaint would benefit others. The second rationale, more relevant to the Meyers I case, inferred "concert" where a lone employee's activity advances a legislatively declared public policy.
Only the second rationale was necessary to protect Mr. Prill, according to Member Zimmerman, even assuming the first rationale was an
unwarranted extension of section 7. 52
The Board's strict adherence to the Meyers I standards is evident
in subsequent Board decisions. In jefferson Electric Co., 53 for example, an employee was terminated for filing a complaint with the state
OSHA agency about exposure to noxious fumes. 54 Although several employees complained to the employer about the fumes and
three employees were later hospitalized, the Board found that the
complaint was not concerted activity in the absence of group support or authorization. The Reagan Board rejected any expanded
Alleluia concept of a volunteer spokesperson where no statutory
right is involved. An employee retains her protected status when
acting for a group, but more explicit authorization of that representative status now may be required. 55
51. Meyers/, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497. The Meyers I test was adapted from a Ninth Circuit
per curiam opinion in Pacific Electricord Co. v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir.
1966).
52. Meyers/, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 499-500 (1984) (Zimmerman, dissenting).
53. 271 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1984).
54. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 176 (1984); Allied Erecting Co.,
270 N.L.R.B. 277 (1984).
55. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. at 176; Allied Erecting Co., 270
N.L.R.B. at 278; cJ. Meyers/, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497 ("In general, to find an employee's
activity to be 'concerted,' we shall require that it be engaged in with or on the authority
of other employees ..."). In dictum, however, the Board recently stated that specific
authorization is not a necessary prerequisite. See Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137, 1141-42 (1986), aff'd sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
The recent case of Salisbury Hotel, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 1986-1987 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) ~ 18,705 (Apr. 21, 1987), suggests the current Board may be less rigid in applying Meyers II. The employee in Salisbury Hotel complained among her fellow employees
and directly to management about a change in the employer's lunch-hour policy. The
employee then called the Department of Labor about the legality of the new policy. The
Board found the complaints to other employees protected as "calculated to induce, prepare, or otherwise relate to some kind of group action." /d. at~ 18,705. These discussions, the Board held, involved a "tacit" agreement that the complaint should be raised
with management. The Board also found the call to the Department of Labor protected
concerted activity as a logical extension of the employee's concerted complaints. /d. at~
18,705.
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B. Judicial Reaction and the Board :S Response
The circuit courts of appeals exhibited mixed reactions to the
Board's earlier expansion of the concept "concerted activities."
Some courts rejected any notion of "constructive" concerted activity, relying on the literal language of section 7 to require action by at
least two employees. 56 Other courts took a somewhat broader approach and recognized the protection of an individual who seeks to
induce or initiate group action. 57 The Interboro doctrine, protecting
an employee who asserts a right under a collective bargaining agreement, was the basis for substantial disagreement among the
circuits. 58
The Interboro dispute was resolved in the Board's favor in the
Supreme Court's 1984 decision in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems. 59
But for the existence of a collective bargaining agreement, the concerns of City Disposal Systems' employee were much like those of
Kenneth Prill. James Brown worked as a truck driver transporting
garbage to the city land fill. Mr. Brown brought his truck in for repairs on the morning one of the wheels malfunctioned. The supervisor assigned to Mr. Brown another truck. Two days earlier, this
second truck had almost struck Mr. Brown's regularly assigned truck
due to a problem with the brakes. Mr. Brown refused to drive the
second truck because "something was wrong with the brakes." The
supervisor sent Mr. Brown home, and the company fired him later
that day. 60 The collective bargaining agreement that covered Mr.
Brown provided, "[t]he Employer shall not require employees to
take out on the streets or highways any vehicle that is not in safe
operating condition . . . . It shall not be a violation of the Agreement where employees refuse to operate such equipment unless
such refusal is unjustified."6 1
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, promptly rejected a literal reading of section 7 that restricts its application to only those
circumstances where two or more employees act together. Even the
most literalistic of appellate courts extended section 7's protection
to a single employee attempting to induce group activity and the
56. See, e.g., Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1980); Jim
Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122, 123 (6th Cir. 1980); Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596
F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d Cir.
1971).
57. See, e.g., Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964).
58. At least three circuits upheld the Board's Interboro doctrine. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205, 206-07 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Mfg.
Corp., 428 F.2d 217, 221 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d
495, 500 (2d Cir. 1967). Four other circuits rejected the doctrine, see, e.g., NLRB v. City
Disposal Sys., 683 F.2d 1005, 1007 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 822 (1984); Royal
Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 363, 372 (9th Cir. 1983); Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB,
700 F.2d 687, 694 (lith Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d
Cir. 1971), and one has expressed disapproval in dictum. NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 717-18 (5th Cir. 1973) (dictum); see also Kohls v. NLRB, 629
F.2d 173, 176-77 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (questioning the validity of the Interboro doctrine).
59. 465 u.s. 822 (1984).
60. !d. at 826-27.
61. /d. at 824-25.
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sole employee acting as a representative of others. Justice Brennan
examined the two justifications used by the Board to support the
Interboro doctrine. First, the employee's reliance on a collective bargaining agreement right is an extension of the concerted activity
that resulted in the contract. Second, "the assertion of such a right
affects all employees covered" by the agreement. 62 Justice Brennan
apparently adopted the Board's first rationale, characterizing the assertion of a contract right as an inherent part of the collective action
that created that agreement. 63
Justice O'Connor in dissent, joined by three other justices, argued
that allowing a contract claim to constitute concerted activity turns
every alleged breach into a potential unfair labor practice. This result, Justice O'Connor asserted, undermines the well-established
principle that a violation of a collective bargaining agreement does
not, in and of itself, constitute an unfair labor practice. Congress
explicitly rejected a proposed NLRA provision that would have
made contract breaches unfair labor practices. Although a collective
bargaining agreement is enforceable in court, Justice O'Connor explained, a violation of the contract constitutes an unfair labor practice only when the breach also qualifies as an unlawful mid-term
contract modification under section 8(d). 64
Armed with the Supreme Court's rejection of a narrow interpretation of section 7, two circuit courts questioned the Board's section 7
analysis in Meyers I. In considering the Meyers I decision on appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded "that the Board erred when it decided that its new definition
of 'concerted activities' was mandated by the NLRA." 65 The court
62. /d. at 829.
63. See id. at 831-32.
64. /d. at 842-43 (O'Connor,]., dissenting). The enforcement of collective bargaining agreements was "left to the usual processes of the law and not to the ... Board."
H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1946); see NLRB v. C & C Plywood, 385
u.s. 421, 427-28 (1967).
Justice O'Connor's argument misconceives the effect of the Court's ruling. She interprets the result as meaning "every contract claim could be the basis for an unfair labor
practice complaint. But the law is clear that an employer's alleged violation of a collective agreement cannot, by itself, provide the basis for an unfair labor practice complaint." 465 U.S. at 842-43 (emphasis in original). Whether or not the employer
violated the contract, however, is irrelevant to the protection provided under section 7
by the majority. If an employee is fired for asserting a collectively bargained right, the
Board need determine only that the employee reasonably and honestly believed she was
asserting a contract right. The employee is protected by her reasonable and good faith
belief even if she ultimately is proven wrong. The employee's discharge for her contractual protest is the basis of the unfair labor practice charge, not any alleged violation of
the collective bargaining agreement. See Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B.
1295, 1298-99 n.7 (1966) (merit of employee's complaint" 'is irrelevant to the question
of whether employees are engaging in protected concerted activity.' ") (quoting Mushroom Transp. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1150, 1158 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 330 F.2d 683
(3d Cir. 1964)), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
65. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original).
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strongly criticized the Board for ignoring and misinterpreting the
more expansive concepts of "concerted activities" already recognized in prior court and Board decisions. Although the Board could
have been justified in reaching the same conclusion as an exercise of
its discretion and expertise in interpreting the Act, the court noted,
the statute did not compel such an interpretation. 66 The case was
remanded to permit the Board an opportunity to reconsider the decision in light of relevant court decisions and policy implications. 67
The Second Circuit responded in a similar fashion in Ewing v.
NLRB. 68 The Second Circuit agreed with the D.C. Circuit that the
Board was mistaken in its conclusion that the Meyers I rule is a required reading of section 7. This case also was remanded for the
Board to provide a reasoned explanation of its statutory
construction. 69
In Meyers II the Board considered the D.C. Circuit's remand and
reaffirmed its earlier conclusion as a "reasonable construction" of
section 7. 70 The Board distinguished City Disposal by focusing on
the Court's emphasis on the link between the action of the individual and the group. The Board acknowledged that a single employee
may engage in concerted activity when that link is established by
underlying group activity; specific authorization of representation,
the Board stated, is unnecessary. 71 According to the Board, in City
Disposal, the group link was a continuation of the ongoing concerted
activity establishing the union-management relationship and the
collective bargaining agreement. The Board concluded that no such
link is evident in the assertion of a statutory right. 72

II.

Taking Another Look

A.

Statutory Analysis
Most attempts by courts and commentators to clarify the scope of
protection for concerted activities focus on traditional approaches
to statutory analysis. These include reliance on the literal or "plain
meaning" of the statutory language, examination of legislative history, and identification of underlying statutory policies that will be
furthered by the proposed interpretation. The plain meaning approach can be dismissed without fanfare as already rejected by the
Supreme Court in City Disposal. 73 As the Court noted, "[a]lthough
66. Id. at 954.
67. Id. at 957.
68. 768 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1985); see supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
69. /d. at 55-56.
70. 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137, 1138 (1986).
71. /d. at 1141; see Salisbury Hotel, Inc. 283 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 1986-1987 NLRB
Dec. (CCH) ~ 18,705 (Apr. 21, 1981);seealso supra note 55. The Board further endorsed
the Mushroom Transportation standard protecting employees who attempt to initiate, to
induce, or to prepare for group action. 123 L.R.R.M. at 1142; see Salisbury Hotel, Inc.
283 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 1986-1987 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 18,705 (Apr. 21, 1987), discussed in supra note 55.
72. 123 L.R.R.M. at 1142.
73. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984). Nor has any other court
taken a strictly literal view of the section 7 language.
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one could interpret the phrase, 'to engage in other concerted activities,' to refer to a situation in which two or more employees are
working together at the same time and the same place toward a
common goal, the language of section 7 does not confine itself to
such a narrow meaning." 74 Section 7 is of pivotal significance in
protecting the American worker. A constrained definitional analysis
of section 7 seems no more appropriate than an attempt to determine the literal meaning of "to discriminate" in section 703(b) of
Title VII. 75
Several commentators offer extensive analyses of section 7's legislative history in efforts to ferret out the true intent of the "concerted
activities" language. 76 This critical terminology was taken from an
equivalent provision in the NLRA's predecessor, the National Industrial Recovery Act. 77 The National Industrial Recovery Act, in
tum, adopted the language from the Norris-LaGuardia Act, passed
in 1932 to prohibit federal court injunctions in "labor disputes." 7 8
From this historical perspective, commentators argue that section 7
never was intended to eliminate protection of the single employee.
Rather, the protection of group activity was in addition to the implicit individual protection inherent in the concept of industrial
democracy. 79
Commentators thus make a strong argument, based on legislative
history, that section 7 was not designed to foreclose the protection of
some types of individual activity. Assuming that much is clear, however, the legislative history cannot fairly be interpreted to establish
the intent of individual protection. The Board and the courts might
inquire justifiably into why Congress did not explicitly include such
protection if it were intended. Although commentators attempt to
respond to this problem, the legislative history ultimately is unlikely
to convince the courts of the "correctness" of individual protection.
The wholesale adoption of the language from other sources might
suggest that little thought was given to the precise boundaries of
74. /d.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982).
76. See, e.g., Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 331 (finding that the history of the
NLRA suggests that it was intended to encompass the individual's right to complain and
to act on his own behalf); Lynd, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activity After Union Recognition: A Study of Legislative History, 50 IND. LJ. 720, 725 (1975) (arguing that the NLRA
was intended by Congress to protect as "concerted" employment-related activities
whether undertaken by one person or many).
77. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 195, 198 (1933) (held
unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
78. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 4, 47 Stat. 70, 70 (1932) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1982)). For a thorough review of the relevant legislative history, see
Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 331-46.
79. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 338-46; Lynd, supra note 76, at 727-34;
Note, Individual Rights for Organized and Unorganized Employees Under the National Labor Relations Act, 58 TEX. L. REV. 991, 1006-08 (1980).
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section 7, one way or the other. At best, such analyses leave the
issue an open question.
Perhaps the most popular arena of debate in defining the extent
of "concerted activities" is an examination of the Act's underlying
policies. The problem with such an approach, however, is that it
depends significantly on the definition and emphasis given to the
particular policies identified. The subjective element involved leads
inevitably to manipulation of the desired result. In arguing for a
reading of section 7 that would include individual protection, for
example, Professors Gorman and Finkin focus on industrial democracy as an important goal of the NLRA and its antecedents. At the
heart of this right of group protest, they assert, is the right of individual protest. 80 Another commentator describes the "central purpose" of section 7 as encouraging and protecting employee activity;
refusal to protect an individual inherently discourages other employees when common concerns are involved.8 1
Yet another commentator criticizes the Interboro doctrine as undermining the principle of exclusive representation. This argument
reasons that, in the union context, individual employee complaints
circumvent the bargaining representative and thus reduce the power
of that representative and derogate the grievance and arbitration
process. 82 Other commentators highlight "collective" action and
equalization of bargaining power as the Act's central themes. Protecting individual complaints, it is argued, dilutes the Act and runs
contrary to these basic concems. 83
Each of these policies, and undoubtedly others, have a place in
NLRA statutory interpretation. But to pick and choose which policy
is applicable to the problem at hand ultimately seems unsatisfactory.
The selection of other policies, or even differing definitions of the
same policy, leads too readily to inconsistent results. Equalization
of bargaining power and minimization of industrial strife, for example, are policy goals explicitly referenced in the Act's preamble. 84
Some commentators use these goals to reject the type of individual
protection at issue here. 85 When an entire work force joins together
to protest working conditions, their bargaining power undoubtedly
is enhanced. Employee dissatisfaction resulting in a strike or other
kinds of industrial strife likely will be reduced by the right to demand negotiations with the employer. Yet these same advantages,
80. Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 338-46. See generally Summers, Industrial Democracy, supra note 12, at 29-34.
81. Northwestern Note, supra note 21, at 836.
82. See Note, Individual Employee Rights Versus the Rights of Employees as a Group: NLRB
v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 27 B.C.L. REV. 453,470-78 (1986); cf. Note, Alleluia, The
Buck Stops Here: The Parameters of Individual Protected Concerted Activity Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 347, 374 (1985).
83. See Bethel, Constructive Concerted Activity Under the NLRA: Conflicting Signals from the
Court and the Board, 59 IND. LJ. 583, 601-03 (1984); Note, The Requirement of 'Concerted'
Action Under the NLRA, 53 CoLuM. L. REv. 514, 529 (1953); Note, Protection of Individual
Action As "Concerted Activity" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 68 CoRNELL L. REv.
369, 389-92 (1983).
84. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
85. See supra note 83.
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albeit to a lesser degree, are just as likely to result from protection
of the individual voice. The bargaining power of a single employee
is increased with the protected right to communicate concerns and
complaints. Rejecting that right could lead to further employee
frustration, resulting in some level of "strife" in the workplace.
The examination of underlying policies is a useful tool of statutory analysis but offers only limited insight in resolving the fundamental question concerning the scope of section 7. No single policy
underlies all of the Act's various provisions. Determining the appropriate interpretation of section 7 by policy analysis requires
agreement on (1) what policies constitute bases for the Act,
(2) which of those policies are relevant in an analysis of section 7,
(3) how the relevant policies are defined in this context, and (4) how
those policies will be furthered or hindered by competing statutory
interpretations. With so many opportunities for debate, it is not
surprising that such disparate results can be reached using the same
analytical approach.
B.

Structural Analysis

This Article proposes that section 7 be reexamined in light of the
structure of the NLRA. Instead of a collection of substantive rights,
the Act, from this perspective, creates a process by which employees
and employers communicate with each other a labormanagement dialogue supported, encouraged, and protected by the
NLRA's structure. The results of that dialogue, however, generally
are left to the parties; the Act does not guarantee successful resolution. This concept of communication provides the common thread
that links the Act's substantive provisions, as well as the important
underlying policies identified by various commentators. 86
Focusing on the Act's structure avoids much of the multi-level
and manipulative debate of identifying, interpreting, and applying
competing policies. Instead of starting with the value-loaded question of what should be protected to promote the NLRA's policies,
one begins with the more neutral question of how employee rights
(whatever they may be) are protected under the Act's scheme.
Agreement on the nature of that process narrows the issue of contention to one of degree. If communication is the procedural key to
the NLRA, the communication right of a single employee is compatible with that structure almost by definition. The debate then is limited to evaluating the relative benefits and burdens of extending the
86. Cj Summers, Industrial Democracy, supra note 12, at 34 ("[T]he primary purpose
[of the NLRA] was to give employees an effective voice, through collective bargaining, in
determining the terms and conditions of their employment.").
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commu~ication process on a continuum from group to individual
expressiOn.
The crafting of and restrictions on employee and employer rights
and obligations under the NLRA illustrate the dialogue theme. The
right of employees to communicate with each other is protected explicitly by the section 7 rights "to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations. " 87 During non-working time, employees
have a presumptive right to discuss such matters and solicit support
from fellow employees. 88 Subject to the Board's procedural requirements, employees may voice their desire for union representation through a secret-ballot election. 8 9
When representative status is achieved, unions and employers
have a duty to bargain under the Act, yet neither party is required to
agree to any proposal. 90 As the Supreme Court stated shortly after
the enactment of the NLRA, "[t]he theory of the Act is that free
opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about
the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not attempt to compel." 91 The duty to bargain is reinforced by prohibiting the employer from changing any term or condition of
employment without first bargaining to an impasse. 9 2 Similarly, a
collective bargaining agreement cannot be terminated or modified
without a sixty-day notice period "to meet and confer." 93
The Act also requires as a condition of contract termination or
modification that the party notify the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (the Service). 94 The Service, an agency independent
of the Board, was created to assist in the communication process of
negotiations. 95 Consistent with limitations of the NLRA, however,
the Service has no power to compel settlement or agreement.96
The protection of comn'mnication processes is further reflected in
the substantial protection and deference afforded grievance/arbitration procedures. The Supreme Court recognizes the
promotion and enforcement of these procedures as a high priority

87. 29 u.s.c. § 157 (1982).
88. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797 (1945).
89. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1982); NLRB Statements of Procedures, 29 C.F.R.
§§ 101.17-.21 (1987).
90. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1982); see H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99,
104 (1970); see also NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I, 45 (1937) ("The
Act does not compel agreements between employers and employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever."). Section 8(d) of the Act, added in 1947, explicitly states
that the duty to bargain "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession." 29 U.S.C. § I 58(d) (1982).
91. jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 45.
92. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405,409 (1964); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S.
736, 744 (1962).
93. 29 u.s.c. § 158(d) (1982).
94. /d.
95. See id. § 171 (a) ("It is the policy of the United States that ... the best interest of
employers and employees can most satisfactorily be secured by the settlement of issues
between employers and employees through the processes of conference and collective
bargaining between employers and the representatives of their employees.").
96. See id. § 203.
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of national labor policy. 97 Any doubt as to whether an arbitration
provision covers the dispute in question is resolved in favor of arbitrability. 98 Once an arbitration award is rendered, a court must enforce the award unless the arbitrator exceeded her authority under
the contract. In only the most unusual case will an arbitration award
be overturned. 99 The policies of the Act, as interpreted by the
Court, again operate to provide maximum protection to the communication process while not in any way assuring a satisfactory or
"correct" result.
The Supreme Court's enthusiasm for the arbitration process is
highlighted by Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, Ioo a
remarkable exercise in judicial legislation. The Norris-LaGuardia
Act, enacted in 1932, prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctions "in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute." 101
The Court had consistently read the Norris-LaGuardia restrictions
broadly to limit federal court interference in labor-management relations.102 In 1962, the Court included within these restrictions a
federal court injunction against a strike in violation of a contractual
no-strike clause. 103 The Supreme Court changed its mind eight
years later in Boys Markets. In light of the importance of arbitration
to national labor policy, the Court created a judicial exception to the
"literal" language of Norris-LaGuardia. An injunction is now available whenever the employees are striking, in violation of a no-strike
clause, over a dispute subject to a binding arbitration procedure in
97. See, e.g., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455-56 (1957) (holding
that arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements may be enforced by federal courts because to decide otherwise "would undercut the Act and defeat its policy").
98. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960).
99. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 764-66 (1983) (a "federal court may not second-guess" an arbitrator's decision); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-99 (1960) (as long as an award "draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement" courts may not overrule an arbitrator
simply because they disagree with his decision). See generally Aaron, judicial Intervention in
Labor Arbitration, 20 STAN. L. REv. 41 (1967) (discussing the limited role ofjudicial review
in enforcing arbitration awards); St. Antoine, judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A
Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1137 (1977) (reviewing
decisional law and concluding that courts generally should enforce arbitration awards
unless the award is procedurally defective or illegal).
100. 398 u.s. 235 (1970).
101. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 4, 47 Stat. 70, 70-71 (1932) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982)).
102. See, e.g., Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702, 709 (1982) (stating that because the term "any labor disputes" is to
be read broadly, a court may not enjoin a work stoppage even though it is politically
motivated); Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 371 (1960)
(finding that the term "labor dispute" includes picketing of a foreign vessel by American
seamen, and therefore such activity may not be enjoined).
103. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 200 (1962).

1988]

525

the collective bargaining agreement. 104 Indeed, even in the absence
of a no-strike clause, one can be implied in appropriate circumstances based on the arbitration provision alone. 105 The Court thus
is willing to venture far beyond the "four comers" of the labor laws
to protect the parties' right to be heard.
Not all substantive provisions of the Act fit neatly into this proposed perspective. The point of focusing on the structure of the
NLRA, however, is to look beyond the precise statutory language to
the symmetry of the whole. From that viewpoint, the Act creates a
process through which employee and employer communications are
both protected and, in some respects, mandated.
The communication thread that connects the NLRA's explicit and
implied substantive provisions is equally evident in the Act's underlying policies identified by courts and commentators. Principles of
industrial democracy, equalization of bargaining p9wer, dispute resolution through arbitration procedures, minimization of industrial
strife, and the right of association are all grounded in the right of
communication as the means chosen by Congress to protect these
interests. The dialogue component is obvious in such principles as
industrial democracy, encouragement of arbitration, and the right of
association. The connection might be somewhat less apparent when
discussing equalization of bargaining power and minimization of industrial strife. Although a variety of methods could have been selected to accomplish these goals, the one selected was the right of
communication. Employees are free to discuss their concerns and
organize as a group without fear of reprisal. Employees also can
force an employer to talk (i.e., negotiate) with their chosen representative. The employer, on the other hand, lawfully may refuse to
resolve any or all employee concerns.

C.

Protecting Individual Communication

Students of the NLRA might be willing to concede that communication is the rationale or at least one of the rationales behind the
Act's structural approach to employee/employer relations. Many
might respond, nonetheless, that the NLRA protects only group or
concerted communication, rather than individual communication.
This Article next proposes that individual protection should be included within this scheme.
Understanding what is being protected is important to a discussion of why the individual deserves protection under the Act. Individual employee complaints generally fall into two broad categories:
complaints or claims to outside governmental agencies (e.g., OSHA,
worker's compensation) and complaints made directly to the em104. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253
(1970).
105. See Locall74, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1962). A Boys
Markets injunction may then be issued by the court based on the implied no-strike obligation which must be "coterminous" with the arbitration clause. Gateway Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974).
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ployer. Employees sometimes may have a choice. Unsafe working
conditions could be reported to the supervisor, to OSHA, or to
both. Worker's compensation is available, however, only by filing a
claim with the state. Conversely, a complaint of excessive overtime
can be resolved only by the employer, assuming no wage and hour
laws are at issue. Perhaps employers are more likely to discharge an
employee for an "outside" complaint because of the expense that
may result from an agency investigation and the employer's anger at
the "disloyalty" of the whistleblower. 106 Employees are terminated,
nonetheless, for internal complaints as well.I07
One could argue that protecting complaints to governmental
agencies simply is an unnecessary extension of the Act. Many employees who file agency claims already are protected by retaliation
provisions in the relevant legislation. OSHA, for example, specifically prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee for filing a complaint or instituting any related
proceeding. 108 Not all comparable legislation, however, contains
this protection. Furthermore, if only agency complaints are protected, a savvy employee will have no incentive to discuss her concern directly with the employer first. Employers undoubtedly would
prefer an opportunity to address the problem before the government is brought in, yet the current system of haphazard protection
encourages just the opposite. From the employee's perspective,
communication with the employer similarly might seem a more logical first step.
In other instances, the employee will have no choice but to go
directly to her employer. To protect the lone employee's communication right in these circumstances does not guarantee that her
wages will be increased, her work station will be changed, her truck
will be repaired, or the heat will be turned up. Two employees have
a protected right to raise such concerns without fear of retaliation
for making the complaint. A single employee should be given that same
protection under section 7 when protesting terms or conditions of
employment. This protection could be achieved by at least two different approaches. 109 Under one alternative, the complaining individual would be protected by a rebuttable presumption of concerted
106. The discharges of Robert Ewing and Kenneth Prill are good examples of terminations for complaints to governmental agencies. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying
text.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41; Sullair P.T.O., Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 614,
615-18 (1980); Ontario Knife Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1292-95, enforcement denied, 637
F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980); Steere Dairy, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1350-51 (1978).
108. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982). Applicable regulations also indicate that the
provision is violated if an employee is discharged for complaining directly to the employer. See 29 C.F.R. § 1977.9(c) (1987).
109. See infra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
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activity. The second approach would make that presumption irrebuttable. Whether a complaint is made by one or by a group of a
hundred employees, however, the employer lawfully may choose to
ignore or deny the request. The employee or employees only have
the right to protest. Consistent with the Act's approach to collective
bargaining, no results would be required. And as with complaints
by two employees, the protection is lost if the manner of complaining becomes disruptive.IIO
1.

The Statutory Language

In spite of this focus on the communicative structure of the Act,
many undoubtedly will object to the expanded protection proposed
as being contrary to the statute's explicit limitation to "concerted
activities." Although, as critics might argue, the Supreme Court rejected a literal reading of section 7, the Court did not authorize an
interpretation that effectively deletes the word "concerted" altogether. However, this narrow focus on one word is misguided and
inconsistent with the treatment of section 7 in other circumstances.
The Act protects "other concerted activities for ... mutual aid or
protection." 111 This concept should be taken as a whole, not dissected into pieces for microscopic examination. The courts and the
Board have wasted little time analyzing whether "mutual aid" means
something separate and distinct from "mutual protection." If "aid"
and "protection" are given the same meaning, why were both words
included? If their meaning is different, why are the terms so often
treated as a single unit?
The courts have given the "mutual aid or protection" language
the most expansive possible interpretation, described by one commentator as including "almost any activity that somehow affects the
well-being of the employees as a group." 112 In Eastex, Inc. v.
NLRB, 113 the Supreme Court concluded that section 7 protects the
distribution of a union newsletter which, among other things, criticized a presidential veto of a federal minimum wage increase and
urged employees to register to vote. The Court rejected the employer's contention that "mutual aid or protection" should be restricted to actions affecting the immediate employee/employer
relationship. Although the employees were paid more than the vetoed wage, the Court recognized a potential indirect impact on the
company employees and employees generally. 114 In equally attenuated circumstances, the Board has held that section 7 protected a
group of engineers who wrote to legislators opposing changes in
immigration laws that might have increased the immigration of
foreign-educated engineers. 115 The Board's narrow approach to
I 10. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
Ill. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
112. Note, Constructive Concerted Activity and Individual Rights: The Northern MetalInterboro Split, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 152, 161 (1972).
113. 437 u.s. 556 (1978).
114. See id. at 565-67.
115. See Kaiser Eng'rs, 213 N.L.R.B. 752 (1974), enforced, 528 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir.
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the "concerted activities" language in section 7 stands in stark contrast to the Court's and the Board's broad interpretation of the
"mutual aid or protection" phrase that follows.
The literal language of section 7 also has not proven to be an
impediment in limiting the S!=Ope of the provision. Courts have
shown no reluctance to add to section 7 restrictions that cannot be
derived from a literal reading of the statute. By its terms section 7
protects all "concerted activities for ... mutual aid or protection,"
yet the courts and the Board routinely deny that protection if the
activities are disloyal or disruptive in some way. 116 Similarly, nothing in section 7 limits the employee's right to organize. The
Supreme Court requires, however, that this right be balanced
against employer property rights. 117 To expand the language of
section 7 to include individual complaints of common concerns is
no more unfaithful to the statutory language than these implied
limitations.
The NLRA holds a special place in our legal system as the first
and only comprehensive federal labor legislation for most American
workers. 118 Although other statutes establish requirements for selected employment conditions, 119 only the NLRA purports to address all terms and conditions of employment. And only the NLRA
addresses employment terms by allowing employees themselves to
have a voice in what those terms should be, as opposed to externally-imposed governmental determinations. For the employee, the
Act functions like a worker's bill of rights and should be construed
accordingly.
The NLRA represents a dynamic conception of the working relationship capable of growing with our evolving understanding of the
workplace and employee needs. Although the Act's framers might
not have fully considered the extent of individual protection in the
1976); see also Altex Ready Mixed Concrete Corp., 223 N.L.R.B. 696 (1976), enforced, 542
F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1976); Socony Mobil Oil Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1965), enforced, 357
F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1966); Walls Mfg. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1962), enforced, 321 F.2d
753 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 923 (1963).
116. See supra note 24.
117. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
351 u.s. 105, 107 (1956).
118. Railway and transportation employees, of course, were covered since 1926
under the Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45
U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982)). The NLRA also does not extend coverage, for example, to
governmental employees, agricultural employees, domestic service employees, and supervisors. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)-(3) (1982).
119. Examples of other labor legislation that impose mandatory employment terms
include the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982) (minimum wage,
overtime compensation); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(1982) (safety standards); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982) (discrimination); Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982) (sex discrimination in wages); and state
workers compensation laws.
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statutory scheme, the communication structure created is both compatible with the protection proposed and necessary to adjust that
structure to employee-management relations fifty years later. The
continued viability of the Act is dependent upon the Board's willingness to mold the legislation to the demands of labor relations in the
1980s and 1990s. In the words of the Supreme Court, the Board
must accept its "responsibility to adapt the Act to changing patterns
of industriallife."I2o
The framers of other statutes undoubtedly would be surprised to
learn of their evolution and expansion. The enforcement of Title
VII in the 1970s and 1980s required recognition of more subtle
forms of discrimination in sexual harassment 121 and the disparate
impact of neutral employment practices. 12 2 Indeed, the Supreme
Court relies on the fundamental purpose of Title VII to justify rulings that the language itself literally prohibits. Pursuant to appropriate affirmative action plans, employers are permitted to consider
an individual's race or sex in making employment decisions. 123 Similarly, section 1983 developed a life of its own exceeding its proponents' expectations. 124 The maturing of the NLRA, as proposed,
presents a far less dramatic extension.
2.

Benefits and Burdens

Why should the individual be accorded the same protection as a
"concerted" group of two or more persons? The interests of both
workers and management suggest there is much to be lost and little
to be gained by denying this protection. The employee loses a fundamental right of speech - the right to voice her complaints without risking discipline or discharge. The loss of that right is based on
the often fortuitous fact that the employee went to the employer
120. NLRB v.J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975); see NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 839-40 (1984) (noting "importance of 'the Board's special
function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial
life'" (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963))); cf. First Nat'l
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 675 (1981) ("Congress deliberately left the
words 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment' [Section 8(d)]
without further definition, for it did not intend to deprive the Board of the power further
to define those terms in light of specific industrial practices."). Having evaded this responsibility, the Board's current interpretation of section 7 therefore is not entitled to
the deference usually accorded the Board's statutory construction. See Weingarten, 420
U.S. at 266-67; American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965); Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 235-36; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 196-97 (1941).
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court often discusses the deference due the Board's
expertise only when the Court agrees with the Board's conclusion. Compare First Nat'l
Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (containing no reference to judicial deference)
with Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 495-98 (1979) (discussing at length the
"considerable deference" due the Board).
121. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
122. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-32 (1971).
123. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1460
(1987) ("[Section] 703 [of Title VII] has been interpreted ... to permit what its language read literally would prohibit.") (O'Connor, J., concurring).
124. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (municipalities liable
under section 1983 without qualifying immunities); Nichol, Federalism, State Courts, and
Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REv. 959 (1987).
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alone without the aid of a friend. Had the employee understood the
ramifications of that fact, she certainly would have taken a co-worker
with her or convinced the co-worker to allow her to speak as their
joint representative. Surely we cannot expect an employee to know
the legal significance of her actions in this respect, at least not until
it is too late.
As other commentators have discussed persuasively, the Act's
protection should not depend on chance. 125 The fortuity of refusing section 7 coverage to the lone employee while protecting that
employee if she happens to bring a friend is a largely irrational distinction from the employee's perspective. The appearance of unfairness in the administration of the Act is almost ovenvhelming.
Although protection of one employee may do little to promote the
type of collective bargaining power referenced in section 1 of the
Act, neither does the traditional protection afforded two employees
in identical circumstances.
From the employer's perspective, the protection of such a fundamental employee right involves minimal cost. Again, the employer
need not satisfy the employee's request. The employer could not
lawfully discipline or discharge two employees making the same request jointly. To permit a sole employee to raise the same complaint adds only a nominal burden on management's prerogatives.
Undoubtedly many employers, already cautious due to the recent
rise in wrongful discharge actions, 126 would consider such protection no practical burden at all in conjunction with policies already in
place requiring "for cause" terminations.
Protecting the voice of the individual in fact may provide some
significant advantages for the employer. A number of studies
demonstrate that employee turnover is lower in unionized
workforces than in unorganized facilities. Employee resignations,
according to one study by Professors Freeman and Medoff, 127 are
reduced from 31 to 65 percent when employees are organized, and
unionization increases employee tenure between 23 and 32 percent.128 When Professors Freeman and Medoff attempted to isolate
the cause of this phenomenon, they concluded that the "voice" provided to employees through union representation constituted the
125. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 329, 344-46; Note, The Requirement of
"Concerted" Action Under the NLRA, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 514, 517 (1953). But see Bethel,
Constructive Concerted Activity Under the NLRA: Conflicting Signals from the Court and the Board,
59 IND. LJ. 583, 603-04 (1984).
126. See, e.g., The Employment-At-Will issue: A BNA Special Report, 2 NEws AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION, LABOR RELATIONS REPORTER (BNA) No. 23, 11 (Nov. 22, 1982);
Note, Wrongful Termination of Employee at Will: The California Trend, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 259,
260-61 (1983); Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REv. 153,
153-61 (1981).
127. R. FREEMAN AND]. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 94-107 (1984).
128. /d. at 108.
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dominant influence. Employees were less inclined to quit their jobs
in a unionized shop because of their enhanced ability to communicate with the employer. 129 Although the effect of protecting employee complaints is unlikely to be as dramatic, this evidence
suggests there actually may be cost savings for the employer in reduced turnover.
Protection of the employee voice also can benefit employers hoping to defeat any future efforts of union organization. A study by
the National Industrial Conference Board concluded that the more
employee "voice" permitted, the more likely a company is to win a
union election. Employers with no complaint policy won only 44
percent of their elections, while companies with an "open door"
policy won 51 percent of the time. Employers with formal grievance
appeals procedures fared even better, winning 79 percent of their
union elections. 130 The same study further reported that 63 percent
of employers who defeated union organization immediately introduced new complaint policies or procedures. 131 Such behavior implies that the absence of an employee right to voice dissatisfaction is
perceived by employers themselves as an important factor in
prompting union organization. When the employer already is providing a communication channel for employee concerns, the need
for and likelihood of union organization evidently are diminished
significantly.
Protecting the individual offers practical advantages as well in the
NLRA's administration. The Board's current approach creates an
anomaly between the legality of threats of discharge and the discharge itself. In Certified Service, Inc., 132 the Board found an employer in violation of section 8(a)(l) for threatening retaliation
against employees for filing an OSHA complaint. Following an
OSHA inspection that resulted in the company being fined, a supervisor shouted to a group of employees that when he discovered who
reported to OSHA, "they was gone." When the employer identified
and fired the culprit, however, the Board declined to find the employee's complaint protected concerted activity. 133 If the threat itself is unlawful, "making good" on the illegal threat should be
equally improper.I34
Individual protection also offers an opportunity for clear
129. /d. at 108-09.
130. /d.
131. /d. Cj. R. LEWIS & W. KRUPMAN, WINNING N.L.R.B. ELEcnONS: MANAGEMENT
STRATEGY AND PREVENTIVE PROGRAMS 17 (2d ed. 1979) ("A major cause of unsatisfactory
employee relations is poor communications or no communications at all. It is a truism
in human relations, whether at home or at work, that communicating can avoid misunderstanding. But, communicating is a two-way process. It requires listening, as well as
speaking.").
132. 270 N.L.R.B. 360 (1984).
133. /d. at 360.
134. See Ewing v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[I]t is somewhat mystifying
that the Board should find that an employer's threat to a group of its employees that it
would discharge those responsible for filing a safety complaint is a violation of section
8(a)(l), and yet not find the actual discharge of an employee who filed the complaint to
be such a violation.").
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guidelines to govern both employer and employee behavior. An
employee could not be terminated lawfully for work-related inquiries unless the means used were unprotected under long-standing
Board criteria. The Board would have no need to consider or ponder the indistinct line between individual action and group authorization of a representative. The employer's knowledge of the
concerted nature of the action would no longer be a necessary requirement, 135 although it would remain important in cases where
the reason for discharge is disputed. Thus, when an employer
claims the employee was fired for poor performance and the employee claims retaliation for complaints, the employer's knowledge
of the complaint is a very relevant concern. In most cases, however,
the employee admittedly was discharged for the complaint, but
whether the company was aware that the employee was acting as a
spokesman for others is unclear.I36
The knowledge requirement for a finding of concerted activity is
particularly unsatisfactory. The prerequisite of employer knowledge seems inconsistent with the well-established principle, in the
context of other section 8(a)(l) violations, that employer motive is
usually irrelevant. 137 The Board's concern rests solely on whether
the employer conduct had a tendency to interfere with employee
section 7 rights, that is, what was the effect of the employer's action?138 As some commentators note, the discharge of an employee
for voicing her work-related complaint predictably will discourage
other employees from engaging in similar conduct. The discharge
thus "restrains" employees within the meaning of section 8(a)(l). 139
More significantly, the knowledge requirement unfairly places the
risk of a mistake on the party who will be injured the most. Assume
135. See Air Surrey Corp. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 252, 257 (6th Cir. 1979); Meyers/, 268
N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984).
136. See Air Surrey Corp., 601 F.2d at 257.
137. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 351-53; Note, Discharge for Griping as an
Unfair Labor Practice, 62 YALE LJ. 1263, 1269-70 (1953).
138. See Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965) ("[A] violation of Section 8(a)(1) alone ... presupposes an act which is unlawful even absent a
discriminatory motive."); NLRB v. Bumup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 23 (1964); American Freightways Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 146, 147 (1959) ("[I]nterference, restraint, and coercion under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act does not tum on the employer's motive or on
whether the coercion succeeded or failed. The test is whether the employer engaged in
conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of
employee rights under the Act."). See generally Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in
the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE
LJ. 1269 (1968) (arguing that the treatment of motive as a critical factor in certain unfair labor practices disguises the thrust of the Act's prohibitions and hampers its
administration).
139. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 352-53; cJ. Ewing v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 51,
55 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Group support [for an individual filing a safety complaint] may rationally be assumed, absent evidence to the contrary, because fellow employees presumably want to be free to assert such a right without fear of losing their jobs.").
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a single employee approaches her supervisor to question the excessive overtime the employees are required to work. The employee is
fired on the spot for "meddling." Even if the employee was formally designated a group spokesman by other employees, the discharge may be lawful if the employee failed to advise her supervisor
of this fact. A statement by the employee that, "[w]e were wondering when the overtime would slow down," might not be sufficient
notice. Because the Board requires actual, not inferred knowledge, 140 such an ambiguous statement would not necessarily notify
the employer of the concerted nature of the complaint. Acting as an
authorized spokesman, therefore, might not be enough to afford
section 7 protection. The employee must be certain the employer
knows of her spokesman status.
The knowledge requirement reinforces the notion that an employee will be protected or unprotected under section 7 by sheer
chance because the employee is unlikely to be aware of the Board's
interpretation of the Act's limitations. The employer risks little in
the confrontation because the discharge will be upheld as long as
the employee failed to obtain group authorization or the supervisor
can claim lack of actual knowledge of the concerted component of
the action. If the employer suspects the employee's complaint is
concerted, she has two options. She can terminate the employee
anyway, hoping to defend the discharge by proving that the employee was not a designated spokesman or that her suspicions did
not constitute actual knowledge. In either case, the employee remains unemployed. The employer's second option is not to take the
risk and simply order the employee back to work. Exercising this
latter option, the employer loses the satisfaction of firing someone
who complained. The employee remains employed.
3.

Delineating the Scope of Protection

To achieve the proposed level of protection, at least two approaches are possible. The first, more limited approach, establishes
a rebuttable presumption of concerted interest in any employee
complaint regarding working con9.itions. Discharge of the single
employee would be upheld only when the employer could overcome
that presumption with evidence that no other employee shared the
terminated employee's concerns. The second, more expansive approach, protects the sole complaining employee whenever terms or
conditions of employment are the subject of the complaint. The individual complainer would enjoy an irrebuttable presumption of
protection to the same extent that two employees making a joint
complaint would be protected. Both approaches require a more expansive reading of section 7 than even that adopted by the preReagan Boards. 141 The advantages and disadvantages of each alternative are discussed in turn.
140. See Walter Brucker & Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1306, 1307 (1984).
141. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
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The rebuttable presumption approach is more palatable to those
who continue to focus on the use of "concerted" in section 7. A
presumption of shared employee interest retains more faithfulness
to the literal language of the statute even though much diluted from
the Board's current analysis. Group or concerted concern remains
the centerpiece of section 7 protection. The burden of proof is
shifted, however, to the party who is harmed less by the choice between the right to terminate and the right to complain - the
employer.
Presumptions are common devices utilized in other areas of the
Act's enforcement, perhaps with even less justification than the presumption proposed here. Once a union achieves representative status, for example, the Board presumes that majority support for the
union continues regardless of turnover in the workforce. Indeed,
the entire bargaining unit may be replaced without altering or affecting this presumption of continued majority status. 142 The presumption is irrebuttable during the year following certification 143
and during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. 144 After
the certification year, the employer may withdraw recognition only if
she sustains the burden of proving either that the union did not
have majority support when recognition was withdrawn, or that the
withdrawal was based upon a reasonable, objective, good-faith
doubt as to the union's continued majority status. 145
Continuing majority status similarly is presumed when a new employer purchases an on-going business and hires enough of her
142. See Windham Community Memorial Hosp., 230 N.L.R.B. 1070, 1070 (1977) (absent special circumstances "new employees ... are presumed to support the union in
the same ratio as those whom they have replaced"), a.IJ'd, 577 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1978);
Laystrom Mfg. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1482, 1484 (1965), enforcement denied, 359 F.2d 799 (7th
Cir. 1966); see also Eastern Wash. Distrib. Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 1149, 1152-53 (1975);
Harpeth Steel, Inc., 208 N.L.R.B. 545, 547 (1974). Until recently, the presumption of
continuing union support extended even to permanent replacements for striking employees. See Pennco, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 716, enforced, 684 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982); Windham Community Memorial Hosp., 230 N.L.R.B. 1070,
1070 (1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1978). The Board abandoned that presumption in the 1987 case of Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 1986-1987
NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 18,828 (July 27, 1987).
143. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104 (1954). Recognition required by a Board
bargaining order also is accorded a one year mandatory period of bargaining. See MarJac Poultry Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 785, 786 (1962). When an employer voluntarily recognizes a union, as opposed to recognition following a Board-conducted election, the presumption of majority status is irrebuttable for a "reasonable" period of time. NLRB v.
Sierra Dev. Co., 604 F.2d 606, 609 (9th Cir. 1979), enforcing, 231 N.L.R.B. 22 (1977);
NLRB v. Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc., 474 F.2d 1380, 1383 (2d Cir. 1973); Capitol
Temptrol Corp., 243 N.L.R.B. 575, 586 (1979).
144. See Precision Striping, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 169, 169 (1979), enforcement denied, 642
F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1981); United States Gypsum Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 652, 655 (1966).
145. NLRB v. Windham Community Memorial Hosp., 577 F.2d 805, 811 (2d Cir.
1978), enforcing, 230 N.L.R.B. 1070 (1977); NLRB v. Dayton Motels, Inc., 474 F.2d 328,
332 (6th Cir. 1973); Harpeth Steel, Inc., 208 N.L.R.B. 545, 545 (1974).
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predecessor's represented employees to constitute a majority of the
new employer's workforce. 146 Thus, if the new employer, called a
"successor," hires at least fifty-one former employees of the business for a unit of 100 employees, the Board assumes that all fiftyone employees support the union and desire continued representation. The successor employer will be ordered to recognize and bargain with the union recognized by the predecessor employer.
Presumptions of continued union majority support are justified as
necessary for industrial relations stability. 147 A presumption of concerted interest in a single employee's complaint about working conditions is required to protect the fundamental integrity of the
NLRA's structural reliance on employee/employer communication.
In many cases the concerted interest presumption is more likely to
reflect reality than the presumption of continuing majority union
support. Although the latter presumption may be necessary for the
effective operation of the Act, there is little reason to assume the
presumption mirrors the actual sentiments of newly hired employees. A presumption of concerted interest, however, often will come
much closer to the truth. In jefferson Electric, 148 for example, the terminated employee was only one of several who were treated for exposure to noxious fumes. More significantly, other employees
individually complained to the employer about the fumes. The terminated employee was fired for filing a complaint with the state
OSHA agency. One needs little imagination to presume that at least
some employees concurred in the dischargee's complaints.
If the employer can affirmatively establish the absence of concerted interest, the presumption could be rebutted, just as a union's
presumption of continuing majority status may be overcome after
the certification year. Midland Frame 149 is an example of the latter
case. The employee in Midland Frame, a vocal advocate of homosexual rights, was discharged for repeatedly challenging the employer's
dress code by wearing tight-fitting satin pants and clothing with glitter, and by his oral and written protests of the dress policy. The
employer advised the employee that his gay rights activism would
not affect his employment but that "business dress" was required on
the job. The evidence demonstrated that other employees disagreed with the dischargee's protest. 15 o
146. Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Howard Johnson Co., 417 U.S. 249, 251
(1974); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, 406 U.S. 272, 279 (1972); Bellingham
Frozen Foods, 237 N.L.R.B. 1450, 1465 (1978), enforced, 626 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1980);
Miami Indus. Trucks, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 1223, 1224 (1975). In addition to "continuity
of the work force," a finding of successorship requires " 'substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise,'" Howardjohnson, 417 U.S. at 263 (quotingjohn Wiley &
Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964)), and continuity of the appropriate bargaining unit, Burns, 406 U.S. at 280. See generally Note, The Bargaining Obligations of Successor Employers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 759 (1975).
147. See, e.g., Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 100, 103 (1954) (ordering an employer to
bargain after losing representation election even though a majority of employees subsequently signed a letter stating that they no longer wanted union representation).
148. 271 N.L.R.B. 1089, 1089 (1984); see supra text accompanying notes 53-55 .
149. Midland Frame Div., Midland-Ross Corp., 216 N.L.R.B. 302, 305 (1975).
150. Based on this evidence, and the terminated employee's own testimony that he
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Providing an individual with protection for any work-related complaint is a more far-reaching, and consequendy more troubling, approach. This protection arguably ignores entirely the "concerted"
limitation of section 7's language. The term "concerted" could be
characterized simply as repetitive of the broad scope read into section 7's "mutual aid or protection" language. 151 Under this proposal, however, the scope of "concerted" is not intended to be as
expansive as "mutual aid or protection."
The concert requirement is met by the assumption that any concern regarding working conditions inevitably will impact current or
future employees. An individual request for a raise, for example,
ultimately will affect how much the employer will pay other employees or future employees in the same job. More attenuated individual protests, such as criticizing a presidential veto of legislation, 152
would not satisfy the "concerted" requirement. Because the action
of two employees othenvise meets the "concerted" criterion, however, their protest of a presidential veto would qualify for protection
under the broader "mutual aid or protection" language. 153
Defining what constitutes a "work-related" complaint is a problem easily resolved. Under a structural analysis, the communication
right of the individual is the parallel of the right of the employees'
representative to demand collective bargaining "with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 154
Thus, any issue about which a union lawfully could demand bargaining could be the subject of a protected individual complaint under
section 7. The Board need only reference the substantial precedent
and expertise developed to identify subjects of mandatory
bargaining. 15 5
The employee in Midland Frame, 156 for example, would be protected in his protest of the employer dress code, irrespective of
had not solicited support from other employees, the Board adopted the Administrative
Law Judge's finding that the employee's actions did not constitute protected concerted
activity. See id. at 302-06.
151. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
152. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1978); see supra text accompanying notes 113-14.
153. One objection to this result is the re-creation of the arbitrary distinction criticized earlier between the actions of one employee versus two employees. The distinction was condemned, however, because it appeared counter-intuitive from the
employees' perspectives. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. Expectations of
protection for nonwork-related complaints are likely to be more tenuous or nonexistent.
Other justifications for protecting individual work-related complaints similarly are absent when addressing the broad scope of issues that traditionally satisfy the "mutual aid
or protection" provision.
154. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). The employer's duty to bargain is imposed in section 8(a)(5). Id. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
155. See generally THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 757-84 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983).
156. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
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other employees' disagreement with his pos1t10n. The complaint
could affect future employees who might agree with this employee's
objections. The employee would not, of course, be protected from
discharge if he repeatedly violated the company policy on business
dress. The employee could properly complain about the rule but
could not disobey supervisory authority.
Such an expansive reading of section 7 is a necessary growth step
for the NLRA. Union organization has been declining steadily since
the mid-1950s such that unions now represent less than 20 percent
of the workforce. 157 Prompted by the legislation's fiftieth anniversary, commentators have described the Act as outmoded and outdated.158 For the 80 percent of the workforce that is unorganized,
the scope of section 7 protection for concerted activity may be the
only NLRA provision of any practical impact or significance. If the
Act is to remain (or to be resurrected) as a vital and dynamic bill of
rights for the American worker, the lone voice must be accorded the
same status as the voice of two. Continuing refinements in the Act's
application certainly are possible within the statutory scheme. The
communication structure created, however, actually mandates the
extended protection proposed to maintain the integrity of the Act.
Some will disagree with the elevated, "constitution-like" role that
this Article asserts the Act has and should continue to assume. 159
Requiring full protection for all individual work-related complaints
admittedly is a harder case to make than the rebuttable presumption
approach suggested first. Those who demand a closer relationship
to the "letter of the law" are unlikely to share the expanded vision
157. Union organization peaked in 1954 when 25.4% of the workforce (34.7% of the
nonagricultural workforce) belonged to a union. Union membership dropped to 19.7%
(23.6% of the nonagricultural workforce) by 1978. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 412 (Dec. 1980). The most recent
statistics available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics show 19.9% of all employed individuals are represented by unions, although only 17.5% are actually union members.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 219
(1987). The discrepancy between union membership and union representation results
from the fact that employees may be part of a represented bargaining unit without becoming union members if the collective bargaining agreement contains no union security clause, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), or such clauses are illegal under a state's
right-to-work law, see 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1982).
158. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
EDUCATION AND LABOR, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE FAILURE OF LABOR LAWA BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN WORKERS (Comm. Print 1984), reprinted in DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA) No. 193, at D-1 (Oct. 4, 1984); Craver, The NLRA at Fifty: From Youthful
Exuberance to Middle-Aged Complacency, 36 LAB. LJ. 604 (1985); Dunlop, Legal Framework of
Industrial Relations in the United States, DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA) No. 194, at E-1 (Oct. 7,
1985) (address on October 2, 1985 at Conference on the Labor Board at Mid-Century,
Washington, D.C.); Gould, Some Reflections on Fifty Years of the National Labor Relations Act:
The Need for Labor Board and Labor Law Reform, 38 STAN. L. REv. 937, 939 (1986); Summers, Past Premises, supra note 12, at 14-23; Weiler, Reflections on the NLRA at Fifty, DAILY
LABOR REPORT (BNA) No. 112, at E-1 (June 11, 1985) (address on May 30, 1985, before
the Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators, Seattle, Washington);
Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1787-1803 (1983).
159. For an excellent discussion of analogous problems for public employees, see
Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1987), exploring an individual's First Amendment protection for speaking out in
the public workplace.
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of the NLRA needed to support this second alternative. It is an issue about which there has and can be much disagreement. Other
students of the Act may be unwilling to go so far.

III. Conclusion
Any number of methods could have been chosen by Congress in
1935 to protect and encourage union organization and employee
rights. The structure that was chosen is the employee-employer dialogue. The Act unquestionably protects the communication right of
the group, either jointly or through an authorized collective bargaining representative. Without the protection of the single voice,
that structure remains incomplete and ultimately unstable. Having
observed retaliation against one fellow employee for her unwelcome
complaints, other employees will be quickly silenced. Labor scholars will know that the employee needed only the support of a friend
to prevent her termination. The employees are likely to know only
that someone was fired for voicing her criticisms.
The stumbling block for some courts and the Board in extending
the scope of section 7 is the language of the section itself. The word
"concerted" must be given some meaning. Two possible definitions, admittedly requiring a vision of the Act beyond any dictionary
meaning, are suggested. The first presumes group interest whenever the individual's complaint could affect the terms and conditions
of employment for at least one other employee. This presumption
may be overcome in appropriate cases by evidence that others disagreed with the individual's protest. The second approach to the
"concerted" requirement also presumes group interest, but this
presumption is irrefutable. Any employee complaint concerning
terms or conditions of employment would be a protected communication. It is assumed that any employment-related request eventually will affect present or future employees in some way.
Under this proposal, little is sought from the employer and much
is gained for the employee. The employer no longer will be allowed
to interfere with employee statutory rights to file agency complaints
or to retaliate for complaints brought directly to the employer. The
complaints themselves may be ignored entirely or resolved in any
way the employer chooses. The employee is permitted to use the
statutory procedures created for her own protection and to voice
her concerns directly to her employer. The protection sought is so
modest that the level of controversy caused by this issue surely must
be hard for Mr. Ewing and Mr. Prill to understand.
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